The Caucasus has been, and, judging by recent events, still is, a zone of civilizational fault lines that are highly conflict-ridden. Similar zones exist in other regions of the world, such as the Balkans, where the traces of acute interethnic conflicts are likely to persist for a long time after the dissolution of the unified federal state.

The recent incursion of Islamic extremists into the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, among other things, gives grounds to speak of the ever-increasing role of the religious factor. It is precisely this card that is being played by those who are кровно interested in ousting Russia from the North Caucasus and reducing its influence in the Transcaucasian republics. A publication on this subject, which appeared in an influential American newspaper, stated that the West should use the worsening situation in southern Russia to its advantage, for example, by sending its troops to the Transcaucasian republics to ensure the safety of their leaders. Next, intensify military relations with Turkey.

A similar scenario was used by the West in the Balkan Peninsula. We are all familiar with the results.

So what is it - hopelessness? An irresistible confrontation? Not necessarily. Russia has a successful track record of solving similar problems. And it has been accumulating it for centuries.

For many centuries, Russia has been developing into a multinational power under the pressure of specific geopolitical circumstances. The defining factor has been the long-term alignment of the interests of the peoples in the vast expanses of Europe and Asia, which has contributed to their predominantly voluntary unification. This pattern is also evident in the Caucasus. Here is an historical example to support this claim.

In 1826, during the invasion of the Persian troops, a small Russian detachment, despite the superiority of the enemy, was forced to defend Shusha. The fortress could not be captured due to the steadfast resistance of the defenders, who were supported by the local population, and Abbas Mirza, who was leading the siege, decided to use cruelty and treachery to win over the Armenians in the fortress and force the garrison to surrender. He ordered several hundred Armenian families from the surrounding villages, along with the archbishop, to be brought to the fortress walls, relying on the traditional reverence of the clergy among this people. Under the threat of having all the priests killed, they were forced to persuade their fellow countrymen to "surrender the fortress, if only to save so many lives." But in response to the persuasion, the Armenians shouted from the walls that they would not betray the Russians, and they urged their brothers to submit to the sad fate that awaited them, because it was better for a few hundred people to die than for the entire nation to fall under heavy oppression. It was in this way, sometimes quite acutely, that the need for unification with Russia was recognized by many nations, who, at one point or another, decided to seek refuge behind its borders and benefit from its state protection in order to preserve themselves.

This choice was influenced by various factors, including oppression and threats of extermination from other nations, the hope of protection through a stable government, the desire to maintain a privileged status through Russian rule, and the desire to free themselves from slavery and serfdom. However, in each specific case, only one of these factors played a decisive role. For example, the unity of faith and the desire for religious freedom within the borders of the great Orthodox empire played a significant role in the unification of a significant part of the Caucasus with the Russian Empire. The high moral authority of Russia among many neighboring ethnic communities also had a significant impact on this process.

Let's add a few more details to recreate other important aspects of the past. After one of the battles lost during the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828), the Persian leader Hasan Khan, in a fit of rage, wanted to set fire to the famous Etchmiadzin Monastery. One of the older beks reproached him bitterly, saying, "Sardar, the Russians have been in the Erivan Khanate twice, and they have been defeated twice, but they have never insulted a Muslim holy site when they left." However, after some time, Abbas Mirza, the heir to the Persian throne, decided to destroy this holy site of the Armenian people, and he sent most of his forces, 30,000 men, to besiege the monastery.

A small Russian detachment of only 2,000 men, led by General A. I. Krasovsky, who was stationed nearby, received news of this and, despite the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, did not wait for reinforcements. On August 17, 1828, without any delay, the detachment set out to rescue the famous Christian monastery, taking the shortest route through the Ashtarak Gorge, which was heavily occupied by the enemy. The entire monastery watched with tension and anxiety as the Russian soldiers fought in the encirclement. While the battle was ongoing, Archbishop Nerses, dressed in holy robes, performed a divine service with the entire clergy, kneeling and praying with tears for the victory of the pious Russian army. However, as the battle subsided, the remnants of the Russian force appeared before Etchmiadzin, having refused to surrender any military trophies, including cannons and banners. The huge army was unable to stop this "insignificant handful" of Russian soldiers, who, despite the horrors of death and their terrible exhaustion, carried out the operation to the end. The monastery opened its gates and welcomed its saviors with the sound of bells and prayers.

Such moral acts were numerous in the process of strengthening Russia's position in the Caucasus. In support of this, we would like to recall another military event that took place almost a hundred years later, in the early 20th century, during the First World War, which lasted from 1914 to 1917. In 1915, the Turks carried out a massacre of Armenians on their territory, aiming to completely exterminate them. As soon as the Russian command of the Caucasian Front became aware of this, mobile units were hastily deployed to rescue their fellow believers, and the Armenian refugees were able to escape under their protection. According to eyewitness accounts, when they encountered the Cossack units, they would exclaim joyfully, "We are saved!" They would kneel in gratitude, fervently praying to God for the success of the Russian army. Seeing the Turks retreat in panic, the Armenians enthusiastically explained to their children that the Cossacks were the great Russian knights, unrivaled in horseback combat.

As we can see, Russia's policy in the Caucasus has not changed in this aspect over such a long period, and its moral authority has continued to exist, undoubtedly playing an important unifying role and significantly strengthening the trend of voluntary incorporation of most peoples into the Russian state. It would be wrong, in any attempt at objectivity, to ignore this, just as it would be wrong to ignore the other trend of forceful coercion. It was precisely on coercion and the "conquest policy of tsarism" that numerous domestic and foreign studies of the problem focused.

However, it should be noted that when annexation was achieved through military means, it was often driven by the urgent need to secure the country's borders in areas that posed a constant threat, with the southern region being particularly unstable for several centuries. Russia was frequently subjected to surprise attacks, which were a common occurrence. These attacks were characterized by widespread destruction, looting, and the seizure of people, livestock, and valuable property. After such raids, the affected territories remained desolate for a long time, and slaves were sold en masse to Turkey and other Eastern countries. The ongoing annual aggressive invasions from Crimea, which continued until its incorporation into Russia in 1783, resulted in the deaths of over 5 million Eastern Slavs, primarily Russians and Ukrainians, and considering the demographic consequences, including a decrease in natural population growth, the number of casualties would be much higher. When they are counted in other parts of the southern border, the scale of Russia's tragedy becomes even more impressive.

At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, robberies with the abduction of people, property, and livestock were a common occurrence in the Caucasus. General A. P. Yermolov described the constant threat to Russian borders as a significant concern among other state issues. There were also raids in the regions bordering Central Asia, where Russian captives were sold in large numbers in the slave markets of Khiva, Bukhara, Kokand, and other places. The impressive scale of the disaster is evidenced by the fact that all the embassies sent to various countries in the region from Russia in the third quarter of the 19th century were given government instructions to free its subjects from captivity. Negotiations on this issue generally yielded no tangible results, and the situation remained unchanged.

The military actions taken by Russia in response to these circumstances did not, however, lead to the establishment of discriminatory norms in relation to the defeated peoples. Instead, their main goal was to impose external Russian state restrictions that would stabilize the situation while preserving local traditional self-governance and ethno-national identity. These restrictions were nothing more than a long-term political compromise aimed at gradually integrating the people into the Russian civil society. Since elements of voluntariness and coercion are inherent in the formation of any state, it can be argued that the Russian conquests were one of the components of the overall Eurasian geopolitical stabilization process that took place over many centuries.

In this process, there were also atypical manifestations, such as the incorporation of parts of Poland and Finland into Russia. In the first case, Russia, having become involved in the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century, acted in accordance with the intentions of the allied European powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany) and their initiatives, while in the second case, its actions were motivated by the fact that the territory of the Principality had been conquered from Sweden and had previously lacked any autonomy. It gained autonomy only after being incorporated into Russia in the early 19th century. Many other nations interested in their successful completion also participated in the conquests in solidarity with Russia, which is clearly confirmed. In the Livonian War with Sweden for access to the Baltic Sea (XVI century), Abaza, Circassian and other foreign formations fought on the side of Russia, showing heroism. In the wars with Poland (17th century), when the Crimean Tatars, in alliance with the Lesser Nogais, frequently invaded Russian lands, the Greater Nogais, together with the Russian troops, opposed these invasions. The southern borders of the Russian Empire were reliably protected not only by the Cossacks, but also by the Kalmyks, who participated in all of Russia's wars in the 17th and 19th centuries.

Many prominent representatives of the intellectual elite of Russia's constituent Eastern non-Russian communities sympathized with and understood the expansion of Russia's territorial expanse, for example, into the depths of Asia.

The opinion of the Crimean Tatar educator Ismail Bey Gasprinsky in 1881 is illustrative in this regard: "Russia has not yet reached its historical and natural borders. We believe that sooner or later, the borders of Russia will encompass all the Turkic-Tatar tribes, and due to the course of events, despite temporary stagnation, they will eventually reach the end of the Turkic-Tatar population in Asia. The border, the line that divides Turkmenistan and Central Asia into two parts - Russian and non-Russian - may be politically necessary at the moment, but it is not natural until it encompasses all the Tatar tribes of Asia.

The tendency of the local peoples to show solidarity with Russia can also be seen in the conquest of the part of the Caucasus that was under the influence of its implacable opponents. The war against Shamil was waged not only by Russian troops, but also by the highlanders themselves.

In 1912, Gaidarov, a member of the State Duma from the Dagestan region, proudly reminded the audience at a meeting: "The Caucasus was annexed to Russia due to historical and natural conditions. I assert that from the very beginning of the Russian presence in the Caucasus, native troops also participated alongside Russian forces. The Caucasian population fought against their own people to ensure the Caucasus's annexation to Russia. Only a few districts of Dagestan were under the control of Shamil, while the rest fought alongside the Russians against Shamil himself. I maintain that the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia was both a Russian and a Caucasian affair, and it was not only a matter of the Russians, but also of the Caucasian population itself."

Now we have to regret that the unity between Russia and the Caucasus was established not only as a result of peaceful solidarity. This regret was expressed by Imam Shamil, who symbolically drew a line under his painful hesitation. After experiencing the treatment of himself as a friend and brother while being held captive within Russia's borders, and being recognized as a hero, when asked about the reasons that motivated him to fight Russia for so long, he replied: "Yes, I regret that I did not know Russia, and that I did not seek its friendship earlier."

At an international conference in Makhachkala in 1998, prominent representatives of Russian historiography, such as B. Aliyev, M. Umakhanov, and many others, spoke out against the ideologization of the highlanders' struggle and recognized its futility. When formulating Russia's current policy in the Caucasus, it is also recommended to take into account that the Caucasian War of the last century was a manifestation of intraregional and local interethnic conflicts.

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